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Who’s afraid of Perfectionist Moral Enhancement?  




Robert Sparrow recently argues that state-driven moral bioenhancement is morally prob-
lematic because it inevitably invites moral perfectionism. While sharing Sparrow’s worry 
about state-driven moral bioenhancement, I argue that his anti-perfectionism argument is 
too strong to offer useful normative guidance. That is, if we reject state-driven moral bio-
enhancement because it cannot remain neutral between different conceptions of the good, 
we might have to conclude that all forms of moral enhancement program ought not be made 
compulsory, including the least controversial and most popular state-driven program: 
compulsory (moral) education.  
In this paper, I argue that instead, the spirit of Sparrow’s worry should be recast 
in the language of the capability approach – an approach that strives to enhance people’s 
capabilities to develop their own conceptions of the good by restricting itself from endors-
ing thick conceptions of the good. The distinction made regarding thick and thin concep-
tions of the good helps better capture sentiments against state-driven bioenhancement pro-
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Introduction 
Robert Sparrow1 recently argues that state-driven moral bioenhancement is morally problem-
atic because it inevitably invites moral perfectionism. Sparrow argues that even though advo-
cates of state-driven moral bioenhancement have tried to refrain themselves from making 
                                                        
1 Sparrow, R. (2014a). Egalitarianism and moral bioenhancement. American Journal of Bioethics, 14(4), 20-28; 
Sparrow, R. (2014b). Better living through chemistry? A reply to Savulescu and Persson on ‘moral enhancement’. 
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 31(1), 23-32 
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substantive claims about the nature of morality, the design of bioenhancement programs nev-
ertheless will not be able to remain neutral between different conceptions of morality.2 This is 
deeply problematic from Sparrow’s point of view because our conception of morality is a vital 
source for us to conceive our own moral ideals and understand who we are; allowing the state 
to impose moral bioenhancement onto us is allowing the state to shape us into someone whom 
we might not aspire to become. Call this anti-perfectionism argument. 
 While sharing Sparrow’s worry about state-driven moral bioenhancement, I argue that 
his anti-perfectionism argument is too strong to offer useful normative guidance. I argue that 
if we reject state-driven moral bioenhancement because it cannot remain neutral between dif-
ferent conceptions of the good, we might have to conclude that all forms of moral enhancement 
program ought not be made compulsory, including the least controversial and most popular 
state-driven program: compulsory (moral) education. I argue that instead, the spirit of Spar-
row’s worry should be recast in the language of the capability approach – an approach that 
strives to enhance people’s capabilities to develop their own conceptions of the good by re-
stricting itself from endorsing thick conceptions of the good.3 The distinction made regarding 
thick and thin conceptions of the good helps us clarify why most of us share the intuition that 
well-designed education programs can be applied in a compulsory manner while being reluc-
tant to embrace those loaded with problematic ideologies. I argue that by using this distinction, 
we may better capture sentiments against state-driven bioenhancement programs without fall-
ing prey to the issues I raise against Sparrow’s anti-perfectionist arguments. 
 
                                                        
2 Sparrow 2014a op cit. note 1, pp. 22-23 
3 Sen, A. (2001). Development as freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Nussbaum, M. (1999). Sex and 
justice New York: Oxford University Press. 
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Clarification: State-Driven Moral Bioenhancement and the Worry 
Before I explain why Sparrow’s anti-perfectionism argument is too strong to be applicable, I 
shall give a brief introduction to the sort of state-driven moral bioenhancement that concerns 
Sparrow. Briefly, the idea of state-driven moral bioenhancement comes from Ingmar Persson 
and Julian Savulescu’s 2012 monograph, Unfit for the Future4, where they argue that govern-
ments around the world ought to dedicate more resources to researching and designing moral 
bioenhancement solutions to address urgent issues such as climate change and global terrorism.  
 Many reasons motivate Persson and Savulescu to make this proposal. But we can safely 
sum them up into the following two points: First, more and more studies from psychology and 
neuroscience suggest that our moral shortcomings are linked to our neurological wiring. As a 
result, potentially, we could increase people’s willingness to take part in initiatives against 
climate change and global terrorism by directly modulating our existing neurological wiring 
via biomedical means.5 Second, existing measures such as education seem to be very ineffec-
tive at making a real change in people’s moral behaviours – people might know they ought to 
change their way of living to help reduce carbon emission but still fail to act in accordance 
with their moral convictions. This discrepancy between moral knowledge and moral behaviour 
suggests that there’s an urgent need to design new means to directly modulate people’s moral 
motivations – we must act quickly, once the temperature hits the 2 degrees Celsius limits, 
there’s no going back. Owing to these two major reasons, Persson and Savulescu argue that 
should a safe and effective means for moral bioenhancement be found, governments around 
the world should seriously consider imposing moral bioenhancement on all citizens.  
                                                        
4 Persson, I., & Savulescu, J. (2012). Unfit for the future: The need for moral enhancement. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
5 However, it is important to note that findings that support this idea are still preliminary and require further 
investigation. For instance, whether oxytocin can make people to be more willing to trust others is still unclear. 
See, for example, Nave, G., Camerer, C., & McCullough, M. (2015). Does oxytocin increase trust in humans? A 
critical review of research. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(6), 772-789. 
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  While this proposal is well-intended, some of the assumptions it needs to make are con-
troversial: 
 
[T]he project of moral bioenhancement implies that those people directing it know 
what being more moral consists in. Despite the best efforts of its advocates to make 
only the most minimal claims about the benefits of altruism, a sense of justice, and 
the absence of distorting emotions or cognitive biases, such as racism, any actual 
program of enhancement would inevitably require taking a position on controver-
sial questions about the relative importance of each of these and the desirability of 
different combinations of dispositions. Thus, any state that embarked upon moral 
bioenhancement would thereby be committed to moral perfectionism. (Sparrow 
2014a, p. 29) 
  
Sparrow’s point here is simple – for any state to initiate a compulsory moral bioenhancement 
program, the state must first hire a group of ‘moral experts’ to design the program. But who 
are these moral experts to tell us what a morally superior person looks like? Sparrow argues 
that even if we may unanimously agree that certain behaviours are morally appalling, this con-
sensus is insufficient to ensure an agreement on a conception of the good. Nor is it sufficient 
to ensure an agreement on how to pursue or realise this conception of the good. For instance, 
we may all agree that rape, torture, and murder are morally concerning, and hence find it less 
worrisome for the government to try using biotechnologies to eradicate them.6 However, when 
it comes to conceptions of the good, people often hold different views – some may believe that 
                                                        
6 Sparrow 2014b op cit. note 1, p. 22. However, it is worth noting that even measures that aim to deal with the 
evilness in the world would still spark heated debates. Chemical castration is one of the examples. Although some 
countries allow serial sex offenders to voluntarily choose to undergo chemical castration to shorten the length of 
imprisonment, this sort of policy still can be viewed as coercive and harmful to the prisoner’s right to bodily 
integrity. See Shaw, E (2019). ‘The Right to Bodily Integrity and the Rehabilitation of Offenders through Medical 
Interventions: A Reply to Thomas Douglas’, Neuroethics, 12(1), 97-106. 
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equality is more important than other values, while others believe the importance of liberty 
outweighs equality.  
 Disagreements like this may further entangle with other disagreements, e.g. what sort of 
person would be considered a virtuous person, and what sort of interpersonal relations would 
constitute obligation. In other words, the disagreement is not merely a factual disagreement, it 
is also a disagreement about fundamental moral commitments, and thus about people’s iden-
tity.7 Trying to use moral bioenhancement to alter people’s behaviour in such domains may 
therefore seriously damage their identity.  
 Sparrow’s anti-perfectionism argument, therefore, can be summed up as follows: We 
should reject the proposal for state-driven moral bioenhancement because this proposal pre-
sumes that it is permissible for a state to hire a group of moral experts to shape its people’s 
characters into ones those receiving enhancement might not identify with.8 In such a society, 
people’s conceptions of the good are not viewed as equally valuable. Instead, they are treated 
like pawns that reach the end of a chessboard: despite all the possibilities of what they could 
be, what they should turn into is decided by the experts.  
  
Our Perfectionist Moral Education 
Sparrow’s anti-perfectionism argument, however, is too strong. This argument does not only 
challenge the moral permissibility of state-driven moral bioenhancement. Once we take a 
closer look at the implications of the argument, we will find that this argument also undermines 
the permissibility of the least controversial form of moral enhancement, one that is explicitly 
endorsed by Sparrow: moral education.9 
                                                        
7 ibid: 23.  
8 ibid: 26. 
9 ibid and Sparrow 2014a, op cit. note 1.   
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 When we talk about moral education, or education in general, what comes to mind is a 
picture where the educator tries to guide their students to think independently and to help their 
students to find their own voices. It’s vastly different from using biochemicals to instil a par-
ticular conception of the good. However, if Sparrow’s main concern is moral perfectionism, 
moral education (even the very idealistic version described above) fares no better than state-
driven moral bioenhancement. For instance, in their discussion of indoctrination anxiety, 
Joshua DiPaolo and Robert Simpson argue that some commonly adopted educational practices 
are not reason-engaging. When ‘teaching’ very young children, strategies adopted by adults 
are often entirely non-rational; some are even closer to ‘conditioning’.10 We often see adults 
giving young children sweets or praise when they perform a behaviour we would want them to 
cultivate, inculcating positive feelings for the target behaviour. Sometimes, we also use this 
strategy to encourage young children to adopt the moral beliefs we want them to internalise, 
such as honesty, altruism, and kindness. In other words, when we take a closer examination on 
early education, we will discover that perfectionist practice is widely practiced and welcome . 
 Some may argue that the example of educating very young children is not convincing 
because very young children are not mature enough to have their own conceptions of the good, 
and are not capable of conducting independent thinking to make autonomous decisions. Hence 
they might say it’s therefore problematic to say that making decisions on their behalf is deeply 
perfectionist. It is also imaginable that some may insist that the parent-child relationship is 
different from the relationship between a state and its people, and therefore it is wrong to com-
pare the two in this way. I agree with the point that educating very young children is very 
different from other forms of education and also that parent-child relationship is special, but I 
don’t think these complaints can rescue education from the perfectionism complaint. 
                                                        
10 DiPaolo, J., & Simpson, R. M. (2015). Indoctrination anxiety and the etiology of belief. Synthese, 193(10), 
3079-3039. 
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 Recall the idealised picture of moral education I described in the beginning of this section 
– an education that aims to guide students to think independently and to help the students to 
find their own voices. Living in a liberal democratic society sometimes blinds us to the fact 
that not every form of education is like this. Education can become a tool for instilling prob-
lematic ideologies and oppressive social norms, and it is not rare to see education used for these 
purposes.  
 Of course, we can make a distinction here and argue that this certain ‘education’ should 
be labelled ‘brainwashing’ and should not be allowed in a liberal democratic society. For in-
stance, Sparrow argues that ideal moral education should be run in a manner where the educator 
treats the educated as their moral equals; educators who fail to do this are not genuine educa-
tors.11 This is a good and useful distinction. I agree that a good education should aim to help 
people discover their potentials and cultivate an ability to think independently. However, pri-
oritising values like autonomy is also value-laden. Sparrow and I could still be questioned, 
‘Who are you to decide which values should be the fundamental values embedded in educa-
tion?’ The problem of moral perfectionism resurfaces.  
 I am by no mean suggesting here that we should abolish all forms of moral education. 
Rather, my point is that if we think certain moral enhancement programs (regardless of the 
means by which they are implemented) should not be made compulsory is due to their com-
mitment to ‘moral perfectionism’, we will have to conclude that every proposal for compulsory 
moral enhancement is equally problematic on this ground. Designing moral education based 
on liberal ideals such as autonomy still commits one to certain perfectionist values. Sparrow’s 
anti-perfectionist argument is therefore too strong to help us clarify why many philosophers 
                                                        
11 Sparrow 2014a op cit. note 1, p. 26. 
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(and laypeople) believe there are fundamental differences between genuine moral education 
and other more controversial moral enhancements such as moral bioenhancement.12 
 
Capturing the Worry with an Alternative: The Capability Approach 
Despite the challenges I raise against the anti-perfectionism argument, I do agree with Spar-
row’s general concerns about state-driven moral bioenhancement. What distinguishes my po-
sition and Sparrow’s is how to capture the worries about state-driven moral bioenhancement.  
 To begin with, one of Sparrow’s major concerns is that Persson and Savulescu’s proposal 
might commit to a certain form of moral perfectionism that is at odds with the enhancement 
recipient’s personal commitments. This may then create a moral inequality because the en-
hancement recipient’s moral worldview would not be fully respected by those who design the 
enhancement program. If I understand Sparrow’s concern correctly, then moral perfectionism 
per se is not the real issue here. Rather, the real issue is the threat to moral equality and the 
disrespect to value pluralism. Once the anti-perfectionist argument is understood in this way, 
the task will be explaining why the type of moral perfectionism committed by genuine moral 
education is generally non-oppressive and also respectful to value pluralism, whereas the type 
of moral perfectionism committed by Persson and Savulescu’s proposal is not.  
 The capability approach provides great insight to help us clarify what’s at stake here.13 
In fact, what motivates early capability scholars to develop this approach has much overlap 
with those issues that concern Sparrow the most. The capability approach was first articulated 
as an approach to deal with global injustice and poverty, issues that are extremely difficult to 
address both because of the scale of the problem and also because of the huge diversity in 
                                                        
12 However, whether means that involves biochemicals is always more controversial is debatable. For more dis-
cussion on why the dichotomy between biomedical and non-biomedical means might not always hold the water, 
see Huang, P.-H. (2015). Authenticity, autonomy and enhancement. Dilemata, 19, 39-52; Huang, P.-H. (2018). 
Moral enhancement, self-governance, and resistance. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 43(5), 547-567.   
13 Sen, op cit. note 3; Nussbaum, op cit. note 3. 
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human practice and culture. This diversity makes it difficult for scholars to confidently argue 
that an apparently unjust practice of a foreign culture is truly unjust – it might turn out that the 
practice is only unjust when viewed through the lens of Western ‘ideology’. What makes this 
task even more difficult is that many of the oppressed might not be aware of their oppression 
– they might have adjusted their expectations regarding their lives so as to rationalise their 
suffering. However, should we refrain from examining injustices happening in other parts of 
the world due to a worry about cultural imperialism, we might end up allowing those injustices 
to persist and suffering to continue.  
 Recognising these problems, the capability scholars, most notably Martha Nussbaum and 
Amartya Sen, decided to address global injustice by asking a different question: what are the 
most essential capabilities without which human flourishing would be difficult, if not impossi-
ble? The insight behind this approach is that while we may all have different views on what a 
good life consists in, there is nevertheless a set of fundamental human capacities serving as the 
foundation for the development and pursuit of all sorts of views on human flourishing.  
 Take the capability for bodily integrity and health for instance. It would be difficult for 
an Indian widow to tell if her health condition was poor during the Great Bengal Famine, should 
her needs for bodily integrity and health are constantly denied. Indeed, cccording to the figure 
provided by Sen, despite being severely affected by the Great Bengal Famine of 1943, only 2.5 
percent of affected Indian widows reported that they believed they were ill or in indifferent 
health, whereas 48.5 percent of affected Indian widowers complained about their health condi-
tions.14 The mismatch between reports from widows and widowers shows that people who live 
in an oppressive society could internalise unjust norms and lose the ability to challenge or 
question those norms – while oppressive norms do not destroy all the instrumental reasoning 
                                                        
14 Sen, A. (1985). Rights and capabilities In T. Honderich (Ed.), Morality and objectivity. London: Routledge.  
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of the oppressed, the sanity that could otherwise help these oppressed people identify the 
wrongfulness of their culture’s norms is severely damaged.15  
 In other words, while arguing that bodily integrity and health should be protected com-
mits one to a certain moral worldview, the moral perfectionism it entails is a very special one 
– one where each and every individual member of the society can have his or her own concep-
tion of the good. The fact that this form of moral perfectionism tries to make sure that all will 
possess essential capabilities to pursue their own conceptions of the good demonstrates a strong 
commitment to treating all as moral equals. It is in this way, Sen and Nussbaum assure us that 
their investigation into global injustice commits no cultural imperialism. 
 One thing worth clarifying is that this approach does not require that people must use 
their capabilities to bring about certain human functionings. If this were the case, then enforce-
ment of the capability approach would lean toward totalitarian interventions and might seri-
ously invade people’s right to self-determination, another important but rather abstract capa-
bility. Rather, enforcement should be to ensure that people can decide how (and whether) to 
use important capabilities, such as the capability for bodily integrity, health, physical survival, 
and practical reason, to pursue their own life plans.16 To have the capability for bodily health, 
for example, is to be able to either enjoy good health, or to sacrifice that health, for example, 
by joining a hunger strike. The example of suffragettes who went on hunger strikes but were 
                                                        
15 However, it is not to say that people living under this sort of condition will never be able to develop their 
conception of the good. The fact that there were still 2.5 percent of affected Indian widows capable of reporting 
their being ill shows that some could still overcome this sort of adverse situation and articulate their views. I thank 
the anonymous referee of the journal for raising this point to me. Cf. Nussbaum, M. (1997). Capabilities and 
human rights. Fordham Law Review, 66(2), 273-300 and Wolf, S. (1987). Sanity and the metaphysics of respon-
sibility. In F. Schoeman (Ed.), Responsibility, character, and the emotions: New essays in moral psychology (pp. 
42-62). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
16 However, which capability should be regarded as important or essential capability is itself debatable. Nuss-
baum thinks that there’s a universal list of essential capabilities that all need to have in order to enjoy human 
flourishing, yet Sen explicitly refuses to defend ‘one pre-determined canonical list of capabilities, chosen by the-
orists without any general social discussion or public reasoning’. I thank the anonymous referee of the journal for 
pushing me clarifying this point. For more discussion, see Nussbaum, op cit. note 3; Sen, A. (2005). Human rights 
and capabilities. Journal of Human Development, 6(2), 151-166.  
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force-fed by the government demonstrates how the capability to have health is not just about 
enjoying a healthy life. This is also reveals why despite both resulted in physical frailty, Gan-
dhi’s hunger strike and the suffering of a widow during the Great Famine in 1943 should be 
understood in different ways. The former had the capability to choose whether or not to eat 
enough to be healthy, the latter had no choice but to have low human functioning due to mal-
nutrition.17 
  
Thin and Thick Conceptions of the Good 
Applying the capability approach to addressing the issues I highlighted in the previous section, 
I argue that while it is impossible for us to avoid committing to some form of moral perfec-
tionism, we nevertheless can and should try to make our perfectionism commitment as thin as 
possible.  
 Not all conceptions of the good are born the same. Some assume more than others. The 
more assumptions a conception of the good makes, the thicker the conception becomes. This 
subsequently influences how open a conception of the good can be to working together with 
other conceptions of the good. Take the Confucian conception of the good as an example. One 
major assumption it makes regarding interpersonal relationships – filial piety (xiao) – rules out 
the possibility of it remaining open to many conceptions of the good from Western society. 
According to the teachings of Confucius, harmonious family relationships comprise a key part 
of the ideal good life, and to achieve this ideal, one should obey parents, even if that means not 
doing what one believes is the morally right thing to do.18 This teaching is deeply at odds with 
the conception of ideal interpersonal relationships many people now endorse – even the 
                                                        
17 Sen 2005 op cit. note 16. 
18 In Confucius’ Analects, it is recorded that Confucius believes that ‘in serving your father and mother you ought 
to dissuade them from doing wrong in the gentlest way. If you see your advice being ignored, you should not 
become disobedient but should remain reverent. You should not complain even if in so doing you wear yourself 
out.’ See Confucius. (1979). The analects (D. C. Lau, Trans.). New York: Penguin Books. 
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younger generation raised in countries influenced by Confucian culture disagree with this con-
ception.  
 This example shows that while having meaningful interpersonal relationships is widely 
considered one of the most essential human capabilities, Confucian filial piety as a type of 
interpersonal relationship goes beyond this essential human capability. This is because Confu-
cian filial piety not only endorses the importance of interpersonal relationships, it also endorses 
a specific notion of good that might not be endorsed by people who do not follow Confucian 
teachings. 
 In other words, once a person adopts such a conception of the good, their conception of 
the good cannot consistently endorse those conceptions of the good that prioritise justice and 
truth above ‘harmonious family relationships’. Thus in this sense, the Confucian conception of 
the good is a relatively thick conception. 
 Arguing that the Confucian conception of the good is a relatively thick conception of the 
good is not to suggest that this conception of the good is inferior. Rather, what I intend to argue 
with this example is merely that there are other incompatible conceptions of the good that can 
lead to a meaningful life and that life-affirming interpersonal relationships can be reached and 
maintained in forms that do not endorse filial piety. Should we build up a moral enhancement 
program based on this sort of thick conception of the good and impose this enhancement on 
others, we may risk sending the message that other conceptions of the good, say, the Christian 
conception of the good, are not worth pursuing. Worse, we may end up becoming oppressors, 
forcing our views on others. Thus, when thinking about moral enhancement, we should endorse 
only the thinnest possible conception of the good – in this example, one compatible at least 
with both Confucian and Christian interpersonal relationship values. 
 Similar idea could be found in Thomas Nagel’s defence of liberalism. Nagel acknowl-
edges that ‘liberal values’ such as paying respect to value pluralism embedded in liberal 
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democratic society may suggest that liberal democratic society does not take a neutral stance 
regarding all values (e.g. supporting the freedom of religion instead of supporting Christian 
values), yet he maintains that ‘bias’ towards the liberal values does not cause oppression or 
coercion as a bias towards many of the non-liberal values has done in human history. This is 
because the core consideration for liberal democracy is to make sure that all members of a 
society will not be treated as mere means, but always as ends. As a result, while this principle 
indeed precludes the moral permissibility of a state imposing many conceptions of the good on 
its members, it does not entail that the state should never endorse any values. So long as the 
conception of the good endorsed by the state could be enjoyed by all members of the society 
regardless of their conception of the good, endorsing these ‘impersonal goods’ will not contra-
dict the core consideration of liberalism.19 According to this view, the political structure sup-
ported by liberal democrats could be vindicated by showing the structure to be ‘impersonal’. 
This is because the central concern for the liberal is to have a political structure that can respect 
all as moral equals.20 
 
Measuring The Thickness of Moral Bioenhancement  
I now turn to addressing why, viewed through the lens of the capability approach, the concep-
tion of the good underlying Persson and Savulescu’s proposal is not thin enough to be justified 
under the capability approach.  
 Indeed, in Unfit, Persson and Savulescu have already noticed concerns that are highly 
similar to those expressed by Sparrow and tried to address these issues. Persson and Savulescu 
recognise that some of their views on issues such as moral responsibility and moral rights may 
be philosophically controversial and that designing a compulsory moral bioenhancement 
                                                        
19 Nagel, T. (1991). Equality and partiality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 159-163. 
20 I thank the anonymous referee of the journal for pressing me to further clarify the idea of thin conception of 
the good.  
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program based on their views could be problematic. This is partly why their proposal for com-
pulsory moral bioenhancement focuses on three of the least controversial and the most essential 
moral dispositions: altruism, empathy, and a sense of justice.21 Persson and Savulescu’s strat-
egy shares the spirit of the capability approach I introduce here – focusing on the essentials and 
minimising required value commitments. In this respect, we should appreciate Persson and 
Savulescu’s effort in arguing for the introduction of compulsory moral bioenhancement.  
 However, when we turn to the issue of how to conduct moral bioenhancement, we find 
that Persson and Savulescu’s proposal unfortunately invites back certain thicker understand-
ings of the related moral values. Take altruism as an example. Altruism as a broad moral con-
cept can indeed be seen in most moral theories and would be consistent with most people’s 
conceptions of the good. However, whether the biomedical means the authors suggest could 
remain open to various conceptions of the good is not entirely clear. For instance, during the 
discussion about the possibility of promoting altruism by using pharmaceuticals to increase the 
level of oxytocin in human body, Persson and Savulescu have noted that the type of altruism 
promoted in this way is better characterised as ‘in-group altruism’, i.e. altruism that only ap-
plies to individuals who are considered ‘in-group members’.22 
 Viewing this result from the lens of the capability approach, we may doubt that whether 
this sort of altruism is thin enough to be promoted in a liberal democratic society because this 
sort of altruism is deeply at odds with other potential interpretation of altruism. It would not, 
                                                        
21 See Persson and Savulescu 2012 op cit. note 4, pp. 123-124. Another two vital reasons for Persson and 
Savulescu to limit their proposal for a moral bioenhancement program to these three dispositions are (1) they 
believe these three dispositions are at the core of human morality and (2) there are numerous scientific studies 
suggesting that these three dispositions have biological roots and it is therefore possible to use biological means 
to enhance these dispositions. See Persson and Savulescu 2012 op cit. note 4, pp. 108-111. 
22 De Dreu, C. K. W., Greer, L. L., Handgraaf, M. J. J., Shalvi, S., Van Kleef, G. A., Baas, M., . . . Feith, S. W. 
W. (2010). The neuropeptide oxytocin regulates parochial altruism in intergroup conflict among humans. Science, 
328, 1408 - 1411. De Dreu, C. K. W., Greer, L. L., Van Kleef, G. A., Shalvi, S., & Handgraaf, M. J. J. (2011). 
Oxytocin promotes human ethnocentrism. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(4), 1262-1266.  
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for instance, work congruently with effective altruism,23 an influential interpretation of altru-
ism which values impartiality greatly.  
 Furthermore, even if we agree that altruism, empathy, and a sense of justice are three of 
the fundamental values in human morality, how to prioritise these values may still create disa-
greement. We may follow Persson and Savulescu and agree that part of the reason that we fail 
to make significant progress on curbing climate change is due to our lack of altruistic motiva-
tion to help people who are severely affected by the changing climate. But there’s another way 
to interpret our ‘lack of altruism’, i.e. we prioritise other values. Say, if we prioritise value of 
the rule of law, we’d have to respect the due process of legislation, and hence the slow progress 
in legislating new laws to address global climate change is a necessary evil. This is why while 
Persson and Savulescu could use capability approach to argue that developing these three val-
ues is vital for all sorts of human flourishment, this argument is not strong enough to provide 
a further defence for ‘prioritising’ these three values above other potentially equally important 
values. Arguing that we must prioritise values such as altruism, then, might be problematic.  
 This capability-approach-based critique, however, does not suggest that we ought to re-
ject all moral bioenhancement programs. If a state-driven moral bioenhancement did not intend 
to prioritise any thicker values but instead focused on how to promote the essential capabilities 
that would ensure further development of any of these values, that sort of program could work 
consistently with the insights of the capability approach.24  
 Similar is the case of genuine moral education. Cautious readers may have noticed that 
education might encounter a similar problem when an educator tries to educate their students 
to value altruism and other fundamental moral values. An educator cannot begin teaching with-
out using any concrete references that might implicitly endorse certain interpretations of the 
                                                        
23 Singer, P. (1972). Famine, affluence, and morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1(3), 229-243.  
24 Cf. Schaefer, G. O., Kahane, G., & Savulescu, J. (2014). Autonomy and enhancement. Neuroethics, 7(2), 123-
136; Schaefer, G. O., & Savulescu, J. (2019). Procedural moral enhancement. Neuroethics, 12(1), 73-84 
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values being discussed. Telling students the story of the good Samaritan, for instance, requires 
the educator to spend at least some time explaining the relationship between Samaritans, Le-
vites, and Jews. Some might argue that such a brief introduction could be sufficient enough to 
cultivate an affinity with a Christian conception of the good, especially if this brief introduction 
interpreted the value of altruism with a thick Christian conception of the good. As a result, one 
might think that there’s not much difference between moral education and the sort of state-
driven moral bioenhancement advocated by Persson and Savulescu.  
 I think the concern that education could inculcate particular thick conceptions of the good 
is a fair one, which was partly why I mentioned earlier in this paper that education could be-
come a tool for brainwashing. Indeed, teaching moral values almost always requires us to put 
these values in a certain context which risks ‘instilling’ the student with a rather thick concep-
tion of the good. Yet, again this sort of concern does not suggest ‘genuine education’ cannot 
exist. 
 In this respect, Sparrow is correct in introducing Jürgen Habermas’s idea of the revision-
ary learning process when he’s developing his argument against stat-driven moral bioenhance-
ment.25 The Habermasian account distinguishes two types of ‘fates’ created by external influ-
ences: the socialisation fate and the natural fate. According to this account, although we are all 
ultimately ‘fated’ by our upbringing and genetic endowments, the moral implications of using 
social means to ‘shape’ others (socialisation fate) nevertheless differ greatly from the use of 
biological means (natural fate). The crux of this account lies in revisibility.26 
 According to Habermas, as children, we unavoidably go through a period where we must 
depend on our close family members. During this period, we are passively influenced by what-
ever they inculcate in us. It is in this sense that we are ‘fated’ by our socialisation. However, 
                                                        
25 Habermas, J. (1987). The theory of communicative action, vol. 2, lifeworld and system: A critique of function-
alist reason (T. McCarthy, Trans. Vol. 2); Habermas, J. (2003). The future of human nature. UK: Polity Press. 
26 I recently advanced a similar argument based on the feminist approach to autonomy. See Huang op cit. note  
12. 
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this ‘fate’ and the inequality between adults and young children in this scenario should not be 
viewed as inherently problematic because we can ‘revise’ the marks these social influences 
leave on our minds. It’s like joining an existing dialogue. We need to listen to others first to 
get the context before we can actively contribute to dialogue. But once we have sufficient in-
formation, we may attempt to redirect the dialogue in a new direction as we wish. Conversely, 
natural fate usually leaves little room for revision. This is why Habermas argues strongly 
against using biotechnology to design the next generation – those who are ‘programmed’ might 
not be able, at some point in the future, to revise the ideals imposed by ‘the programmers’.27  
 Following Habermas’s view, we may argue that while we almost always begin our moral 
education with a particular interpretation (hence, bringing a ‘thick’ interpretation of the value), 
well-designed moral education will ensure there’s sufficient room for the educated to revise 
what they learn. For instance, after presenting the story of the Good Samaritan, the educator 
may also introduce other stories about altruism from different cultures to help their students 
understand that the purpose of this moral education is not to instil a particular thicker interpre-
tation of altruism, but to use various references to cultivate the students’ ability to reflect upon 




Both state-driven moral bioenhancement and state-driven moral education contain pre-existing 
moral commitments, which shape, to some extent, the state’s interactions with its citizens. This 
makes the anti-perfectionist argument against moral bioenhancement programs less convincing; 
this is especially so when one wants to use the same argument to support moral education. 
                                                        
27 Habermas 2003 op cit. note 24, pp 60-66. 
28 I thank the anonymous referee of the journal for pressing me to clarify this point. 
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After all, proponents of moral bioenhancement programs could simply point out the hidden 
commitments in the design of moral education and reply that even the least concerning attempt 
to improve others’ morality are perfectionist. This is why I argue that the root of many people’s 
discomfort with the idea of moral bioenhancement program lies elsewhere – in the moral com-
mitments entailed by proposed programs. To evaluate the acceptability of a proposed moral 
bioenhancement program, we need to consider what moral commitments the enhancement pro-
gram carries. For liberals who prioritise moral equality, the answer may be that the conception 
of the good hiding behind current proposals for moral bioenhancement is not thin enough.29 
                                                        
29 I thank Robert Simpson for his generous support and invaluable feedback during the draft-
ing of this paper. I also want to thank Toby Handfield, Justin Oakley, Lucy Valenta, two 
anonymous referees for Bioethics, and the participants of 2017 Annual Conference of Aus-
tralasian Association of Philosophy at the University of Adelaide, Neuroscience and Society 
2018 at Sydney, for providing me with helpful comments on earlier version of this articles.   
